The Big Picture |  |
- 10 Tuesday PM Reads
- Today’s Buys: BRK, V, QQQ, IWY
- Google Charts: What Your Taxes Pay For
- Volcker Rule Risk Concentrated in 25 Banks
- Did QE2 Cause the (Present) Recession?
- Hoisington Quarterly Review and Outlook
- PPI runs hot
- 10 Tuesday AM Reads
- The 8% Solution
- Michihiro Matsuoka Scultures
| Posted: 18 Oct 2011 02:00 PM PDT My train reading this evening:
What are you reading?
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| Today’s Buys: BRK, V, QQQ, IWY Posted: 18 Oct 2011 12:46 PM PDT
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| Google Charts: What Your Taxes Pay For Posted: 18 Oct 2011 11:30 AM PDT Do you really know what your taxes are paying for? Click to see interactive version: The chart above shows what your taxes went towards in 1987. The chart below shows what they went towards in 2010: Source:
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| Volcker Rule Risk Concentrated in 25 Banks Posted: 18 Oct 2011 09:30 AM PDT Bloomberg on the Volcker Rule:
~~~ Table 1: Bank Holding Companies With Average Trading Assets and Liabilities of $5 Billion or More In billions, average calculated using the last four quarters of Y-9 data reported to the Fed from Sept. 30, 2010, through June 30, 2011. Source: Federal Reserve and BGOV analysis ________________________________________________________________________________ 1 Federal Reserve press release and link to draft rules: (retrieved Oct. 11, 2011). 2 Detailed in Appendix 1. 3 As reported to regulators on a bank holding company's consolidated financial statements. This is a quantification of the firm's overall trading activity. 4 Ibid. 10 Assets and liabilities are defined in the proposal on page 11: “A banking entity must comply with proposed Appendix A’s reporting and recordkeeping requirements only if it has, together with its affiliates and subsidiaries, trading assets and liabilities, the average gross sum of which, (on a worldwide consolidated basis) is, as measured as of the last day of each of the four prior calendar quarters.” 11 Average trading assets plus average trading liabilities as reported on Line Items 5 and 15 of the Consolidated Balance Sheet in the bank holding company’s Y-9 during four quarters. 12 Data for RBC was reported for only the past three quarters; therefore BGOV averaged for three quarters instead of four. Source:
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| Did QE2 Cause the (Present) Recession? Posted: 18 Oct 2011 08:15 AM PDT Randall Forsyth of Barron’s asks this rather intriguing question:
Pretty ugly stuff, and I fear all too accurate. > Source:
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| Hoisington Quarterly Review and Outlook Posted: 18 Oct 2011 08:00 AM PDT Hoisington Quarterly Review and Outlook ~~~ Dr. Lacy Hunt and Van Hoisington of Hoisington Investment Management write a "Quarterly Review and Outlook" that is a must-read for me. This quarter they focus on US monetary policy, noting that "After peaking at 1.69 in the second quarter of 2010, M2 velocity declined for four consecutive quarters, and we estimate that a major contraction in velocity to 1.59 is likely for the third quarter." (I mentioned the importance of the velocity of money in judging inflation vs. deflation prospects in this week's e-letter, too.)They say, "If our analysis of a new contraction in GDP is correct, the U.S. economy should be viewed as operating in the midst of a long-term slump, regardless of terminology." They borrow a riff from Harvard economic historian Niall Ferguson, who has asserted that the world is experiencing a "slight depression"; and mention that this conclusion has been backed up by Gluskin Sheff's notable economist, David Rosenberg, who reminds us that "Depressions are basically long recessions lasting three to seven years." Hoisington Investment Management Company (www.hoisingtonmgt.com) is a registered investment advisor specializing in fixed-income portfolios for large institutional clients. Located in Austin, Texas, the firm has over $4 billion under management, composed of corporate and public funds, foundations, endowments, Taft-Hartley funds, and insurance companies. Your kicking up my heels in the Big Apple analyst, John Mauldin, Editor Quarterly Review and OutlookThird Quarter 2011Dr. Lacy Hunt and Van Hoisington Downturn Negative economic growth will probably be registered in the U.S. during the fourth quarter of 2011, and in subsequent quarters in 2012. Though partially caused by monetary and fiscal actions and excessive indebtedness, this contraction has been further aggravated by three current cyclical developments: a) declining productivity, b) elevated inventory investment, and c) contracting real wage income. a) productivity In the last half of 2010, real GDP grew about 2.%. The consensus forecast for 2011 was for growth to accelerate to 3%-4% due to the massive easing of Fed policy (QE2), social security tax cuts, and other fiscal stimuli. Surprisingly, real GDP growth slowed to less than 1% in the first half of this year. When growth slows abruptly and it is markedly at variance to expectation, businesses find they have more employees than desired. Normally, firms are reluctant to resort to layoffs, but a failure to do so means unit labor costs rise swiftly as output per man hour (productivity) falls. This was exactly the experience in the first half of 2011. In the very broad, non-farm business sector, productivity did decrease at a .7% annual rate. Accordingly, unit labor costs surged at a 4.8% rate over the same time period, exceeding the rise in consumer prices. Historically, a sustained and meaningful drop in productivity and a parallel rise in unit labor costs have been precursors to increased layoffs as businesses struggle to restore margins and profitability. Once these job losses commence, broad negative ramifications are felt throughout the economy (Chart 1). b) inventory reversal Inventory investment, the most volatile component of the economy, has contributed substantially to the recovery since 2009. From the second quarter of 2009 to the second quarter of this year, real inventory investment surged by $222 billion, accounting for 35% of the rise in real GDP over that period. Now inventory investment accounts for 1.18% of real GDP, which is .18% above the average since 1990. In July and August, production of consumer goods increased at a 3.2% annual rate versus the second quarter, while real retail sales contracted at a 1.4% rate; therefore, inventory investment moved to an even higher, likely undesired, level. Consequently, as firms move to rebalance inventories, the stage is set for a slowdown in production, requiring a further need to pare staffing levels. c) real wages Real average hourly earnings has fallen by 2.2% over the twelve months ending August 2011. Real disposable income (a broader measure of income) was lower in August than last December. Initially, consumers responded to this lack of income growth by cutting their saving rate back to the recession low of 4 .%, but now an evident slowdown in spending has occurred. Real spending expanded by only .7% in the second quarter, and remains sluggish in the third quarter. This lack of real income growth will contribute to the negative changes in GDP in coming quarters (Chart 2). This reduction in real income can be traced, in part, to the misguided attempts to spur economic growth by the Federal Reserve via quantitative easing (QE2). The QE2 expansion in the Fed's balance sheet backfired as the boost in stock prices (a positive for some consumers) was more than offset by the negative impact of food and fuel inflation on the average family budget. While rising equity values helped a few consumers, inflation in necessities such as food and fuel, decimated real incomes for the average family. Thus, the emergent cyclical weakness that lies ahead can be directly related to the unintended consequences of quantitative easing. Monetary PolicyAlthough many measures of economic performance worsened during QE2, the Fed might argue that the recent M2 acceleration may eventually contribute to an improvement in economic growth as deposit growth fuels income expansion. In our opinion, such an optimistic assessment is not warranted. In the past three months, M2 increased at a rapid annualized pace of more than 20%, and the annual increase in M2 is about 10%, well above the post 1900 average annual increase of 6.6%. This rise in M2, however, appears to reflect a massive balance sheet shift of assets, not a net creation of new assets. Theoretically, if funds are switched from non-M2 assets into M2 assets, M2 velocity would decline and bank loans plus commercial paper would be stable. This is exactly what has been happening. After peaking at 1.69 in the second quarter of 2010, M2 velocity declined for four consecutive quarters, and we estimate that a major contraction in velocity to 1.59 is likely for the third quarter (Chart 3). Also supporting this idea of asset shifting, bank loans plus commercial paper in September totaled $7.845 trillion, down from $7.906 trillion in June 2010. In an environment where short-term interest rates are close to zero, commercial paper has become an increasingly unattractive investment since the low interest rates do not cover the risk premium. As commercial paper has rolled off, issuers have been forced to meet funding requirements from bank loans. However, there are other balance sheet changes taking place along with the shift away from commercial paper. With the credit rating of major European banks sliding, companies operating globally may have moved euro-based deposits into dollar-based ones. Supporting this hypothesis, the dollar strengthened during this surge in M2. Economic stresses and uncertainty are responsible for the increased level of M2, not QE2. The real impact of QE2 was that inflation was boosted and real economic growth stunted. Maturity Extension ProgramThe initial market reaction to the announcement of the Fed's latest policy move, known as the Maturity Extension Program (MEP) or Operation Twist, was for commodities and stocks to fall, the dollar to strengthen, and bond yields to decline. Thus, the reaction was to reinforce trends already in place. These market reactions were the exact opposite of what occurred during QE2. Lower commodity prices and the firmer dollar will diminish inflation, thus serving to reverse the drop in real wages that millions of households suffered during QE2. This benefit will not be apparent immediately because the economy has to work through the negative consequences of falling real income and dropping productivity that occurred under QE2. Unfortunately, it is unclear whether Operation Twist will ultimately accrue any benefit to the economy because efforts to achieve very low interest rates could produce counterproductive or unintended consequences. Banks and other financial intermediaries earn a profit by investing or lending at a rate that exceeds their cost. Due to the low interest rate structure and other considerations, this has become exceedingly difficult, if not impossible. Overnight interest rates are close to zero; thus, to earn a rate above 1% in the treasury market banks must invest at a maturity longer than five years. While this is a positive interest rate spread, all costs may not be covered as banks have to expense payroll, rent, taxes, elevated FDIC fees, and other overhead, and must have a risk or default premium when they lend to a private sector borrower. Therefore, profit erosion of banks and other intermediaries is likely with a lower interest rate structure. Historical verification of this development is obvious in Japan where more and more of the bank balance sheets have been shifted to government securities rather than to private borrowers. In other words, normal bank lending functions are essentially shut down. This risk now confronts the U.S. with the zero short rate policy and with Operation Twist aimed at lowering yields in the intermediate and long end of the yield curve. Fiscal DragThough budgetary reductions have yet to materialize, fiscal policy via tax increases is also acting as a retardant to growth. The effective tax rate on households can be calculated each month by expressing the sum of federal, state and local taxes as a percent of personal income. From the middle of 2009 to last month, the effective tax rate has risen from 17.5% to 17.9%, a $247 billion tax increase (Chart 4). This rise mainly reflects increased taxation by state and local governments to cover their persistent deficits. These increases more than offset the first quarter reduction in FICA taxes. Econometric research indicates the U.S. economy will not grow out of the ongoing slump if additional major tax increases are implemented. In summary, the case for an impending recession rests not only on cyclical precursors evident in productivity, real wages, and inventory investment, but also on the dysfunctionality of monetary and fiscal policy. Slight DepressionThe appearance of a renewed slump only a short twenty-one months after the end of the last recession is highly remarkable. Many statistics support the fact, however, that the U.S. is worse off today than it was prior to the onset of the previous recession. For instance: a) the economy has nearly 9. million fewer fulltime workers employed than at the peak in 2007 (Chart 5); b) real GDP is still below the level reached in Q4, 2007; c) industrial production is 6.7% less than its December 2007 reading; d) real retail sales is $13 billion below its 2007 peak, and e) real personal income (less government transfers) is more than $515 billion below the 2008 peak (Chart 6). The financial markets concur with this "things are worse off" idea. The S&P Index is over 20% lower, and bond yields have dropped more than 40% from their peak levels in 2007. Harvard economic historian Niall Ferguson recently noted that the world is experiencing a "slight depression". This sentiment has also been cogently expressed by Gluskin Sheff's astute economist, David Rosenberg, who notes that, "Depressions are basically long recessions lasting three to seven years." If our analysis of a new contraction in GDP is correct, the U.S. economy should be viewed as operating in the midst of a long-term slump, regardless of terminology. This economic malaise is a direct result of the accumulation of excessive levels of debt and subsequent reduction in the price level of underlying assets. This is a process that U.S. economist Irving Fisher discussed in his 1933 paper The Debt-Deflation Theory of Great Depressions. According to Fisher and confirmed subsequently by Reinhart and Rogoff and the McKenzie Global Institute, a long period of time is required to unwind previous borrowing excesses. These views were recently econometrically verified in a September 2011 publication by the Bank for International Settlements entitled The Real Effect of Debt. This article, authored by Stephen G. Cecchetti, M. S. Mohanty and Febrizio Zampolli, stated, "Debt is a two edged sword. Used wisely and in moderation, it clearly improves welfare, but when it is used imprudently and in excess, the result can be disaster. For individual households and firms, over-borrowing leads to bankruptcy and financial ruin. For a country, too much debt impairs the government's ability to deliver essential services to its citizens. High and rising debt is a source of justifiable concern." Global DebtWe have assembled, with support from Capital Economics in London, foreign debt to GDP ratios that are comparable to the U.S. debt to GDP ratio. The debt figures in these ratios include both private and government debt; thus, they are measures of aggregate indebtedness. These statistics indicate that the euro currency countries as a group, the United Kingdom, Japan and, interestingly Canada, are all more deeply indebted than the United States. This should not give the U.S. solace, nor detract from our severe problems. However, the greater debt in these areas may serve to provide backhanded support for the dollar. More critical is that all major countries are destined to experience slower growth because of excessive indebtedness. The latest readings indicate that debt to GDP ratios are about: 450% for the Euro zone and the United Kingdom; 470% for Japan, and 410% for Canada. Thus, the Euro Zone, UK, Japan,and Canada ratios are 100%, 100%, 120%, and 60% higher, respectively, than the U.S. debt to GDP ratio of 350%. We would like to be able to extend this analysis to China because of its rising importance on the global scene. While the Chinese don’t provide these statistics, a new book Red Capitalism: The Fragile Financial Foundation of China’s Extraordinary Rise by Carl E. Walter and Frasier J.T. Howie (John Wiley, 2011) sheds light on this issue. Carl Walter holds a Stanford Ph.D., is fluent in Mandarin, and resides in Beijing where he has lived for two decades. Walter and Howie acknowledge that China’s model has produced super growth, lustrous office towers, massive, grand new airports and other visible signs of wealth and success. Their disquieting theme is that beneath this glamorous veneer the growth model is flawed and fragile. Specifically, they argue that indiscernible, substantial risks are accumulating in the Chinese banking system–in other words, over-indebtedness. The Bond MarketDuring the latter part of the 19th and the early 20th centuries the construction of the Trans-Continental railroad created an excessive accumulation of debt. The result was a period of low interest rates when the long treasury yield averaged less than 2.% for more than a decade. In a parallel case, the highly-indebted Japanese economy has seen its thirty year bond yield average about 2% or less since 1998. In view of the United States extreme over-indebtedness, we believe that 2% is a an attainable level for the long treasury bond yield. In the previous historic cases yields tended to remain close to their record lows for an extended period of time, coinciding with a long period of deleveraging. Presently the U.S. is in its fifth year of deleveraging, and patient investors in the long end of the treasury market have been financially rewarded. We continue to hold long positions in thirty-year treasury debt, but remain increasingly wary of the potential for further adverse meddling by Federal Reserve authorities. Van R. Hoisington Source: JohnMauldin.com (http://s.tt/13xgl)
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| Posted: 18 Oct 2011 07:23 AM PDT Sept PPI rose .8% m/o/m, 4 times more than expected led by a 2.3% rise in energy (gasoline prices up 4.2% after 3 mo’s of declines) and .6% gain in food prices. The y/o/y gain is now 6.9% and inflation in the pipeline remains robust. Intermediate goods prices rose 10.5% y/o/y (.6% m/o/m) and 20.9% (2.8% m/o/m) at the crude stage of production. Ex food and energy, prices rose .2% m/o/m, .1% above expectations and are now up 2.5% y/o/y, matching the highest since July ’09. While certainly worth noting today, the market’s attention on inflation will be more focused on tomorrow’s CPI report. With this said, inflation readings I believe are worrisome as its taken hold in an economic environment that is best described as lackluster. And, make no mistake, inflation is a tax and when the wages of the average worker are not rising by the same extent, and in many cases dropping, the standard of living of the average person is falling. The Fed hates deflation (why is the falling price of an IPAD bad I ask them) and they are unfortunately getting what they want, to help the over indebted at the expense of others.
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| Posted: 18 Oct 2011 07:00 AM PDT My early morning reading materials:
What are you reading? >
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| Posted: 18 Oct 2011 05:30 AM PDT
His new book, Panderer for Power: The True Story of How Alan Greenspan Enriched Wall Street and Left a Legacy of Recession, was published by McGraw-Hill in November 2009. He was Director of Asset Allocation Services at John Hancock Financial Services in Boston. In this capacity, he set investment policy and asset allocation for institutional pension plans. ˜˜˜ The terminal stage of Dr. Frankenstein-style central banking is disgorging ridiculous claims of authority motivated by reckless efforts to retain control. One such pincer attack is the Federal Reserve’s purported 2% inflation target. Behind our very eyes, this fictional mandate is being raised, all the more reason that savers need to speculate, not a welcome prospect with both inflationary and deflationary influences expanding and bound to burst. A certainty of this age (post-Western-Civilization) is the ease with which libertine policies escalate to fantastic proportions even as they are failing. The Federal Reserve mumbles its 2% inflation target while the “economic literature” has sown the garden for an 8% inflation rate, in the name of “price stability.” To be more precise, “inflation” to the Federal Reserve is conveniently defined as the consumer price index – without including food and energy. This 2% or 8% target should be understood as a negative interest rate. The Federal Reserve will (through its current policy, although this will boomerang at some point) hold Treasury yields at zero-percent. It will target inflation at 2% to 20%. In The Beginning, at least in this short narrative, a Harvard economist told a Senate committee the United States must accept a 2% inflation rate as the cost of prosperity. That was in 1957, a very good year to wrap such a career-advancing declaration inside a Cold War mandate. “Growth” would defeat the Soviet Union. Federal Reserve Chairman William McChesney Martin did not agree. On August 13, 1957, Martin warned that recent inflationary pressures had risen from a period of strong economic growth fostered by “‘imbalances in the economy’ in which ‘rising costs and prices mutually interact upon each other over time with a spiral effect.’ . . . The person most likely to be injured in the inflationary cycle was the ‘hardworking and thrifty…little man’ on fixed income who could protect neither his income nor the value of his savings.” Martin was doomed to lose this battle and the media misunderstood hemorrhaging inflationary tendencies. Inflation was National Worry #1 when the business editor of the New York Times calmed his readers: “Luckily, the Government has the ability and the wisdom not to let inflation break into a gallop as it has happened recently in other countries.” That was in 1966. President Richard Nixon held a farewell gala for Martin in 1970. The soon-to-be ex-Federal Reserve chairman sobered up the tipsy revelers when he removed the punch bowl during his valedictory speech: “I wish I could turn the bank over to Arthur Burns [the next Fed Chairman] as I would have liked. But we are in deep trouble. We are in the wildest inflation since the Civil War.” Moving ahead, Professor Ben S. Bernanke wrote a book that was well received in the right circles: Inflation Targeting: Lessons from the International Experience (2001). One of his co-authors was Frederic Mishkin. Those in the know understand the implications of Mishkin’s cooperation. The book propagated the awful euphemisms (“the zero-bound” and “inflation targeting”) used to disguise their mandate to inflate. Rather, they could have simply stated: “Let’s ruin the dollar.” Some economists took exception. Lee Hoskins, president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland from 1987 to 1991, wrote: “Pundits, economists, and some Fed officials often talk about the fight against inflation or the battle against it or the need to contain it as if it is some preternatural event. The Fed does not have to battle or contain inflation, it creates inflation…. So when a Fed official says the goal for inflation should be 2 percent, he is explicitly choosing to create that rate of inflation.” (“Zero Inflation: Goal and Target,” 2005) Hoskins is not a regular on CNBC’s short list. (See “The Education Gap.”) Federal Reserve policy of 2% inflation is a product of failure and verbal repetition. Bernanke’s Fed needs room to maneuver (“infinite bound”), and a wide fairway to compound its broadening failure, while not losing credibility. Thus, this fictional authority is repeated over and over. Current Federal Reserve Governor Janet Yellen: “This increase in core inflation was below the 2 percent rate that I and most of my fellow Fed policymakers on the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) consider an appropriate long-term price stability objective.” Note the structure of Yellen’s statement. She hides the arbitrary (“consider an appropriate”) under legal cover (“price stability”). The Fed and its accomplices in the professorate train the public mind through such repetition. Even with 2% inflation touted as a mark of price stability, higher figures are working their way into the public conscience. N. Gregory Mankiw, a Harvard economics professor who consistently establishes new lows in personal integrity, wrote a column in the April 19, 2009, New York Times: “It May Be Time to go Negative.” It should be remembered that Mankiw made his proposal because Federal Reserve Chairman Ben S. Bernanke’s grand theory was failing. In October 2011, we know it has failed. Bernanke’s foolish interpretation of the Great Depression has done nothing to halt the housing bust. It is far worse today than in 2009, and probably about to take another tumble. This was an inevitable consequence of the credit binge, of which Bernanke’s Fed has no understanding. We have paid a heavy price for this ignorance. Investment continues its drift towards short-term trading gains and not into industries that need long-term investment to prosper. The result: a country with an inflation-adjusted median income that is 6.7% below that of June 2009. In his 2009 column, Mankiw wrote: “[T]here is a more prosaic way of obtaining negative interest rates: through inflation. Suppose that, looking ahead, the Fed commits itself to producing significant inflation. In this case, while nominal interest rates could remain at zero, real interest rates – interest rates measured in purchasing power – could become negative. Having the central bank embrace inflation would shock economists and Fed watchers who view price stability as the foremost goal of monetary policy. But there are worse things than inflation. Ben S. Bernanke, the Fed chairman, is the perfect person to make this commitment to higher inflation….” That’s enough. Mankiw consistently makes Eddie Haskell’s syrupy conversations with Ward Cleaver sound like General Patton’s misadventure with the hospitalized soldier. Note that Mankiw was behind the times. He needed to justifying negative interest rates even though such a course is inconsistent with the Fed’s mandated goal of “price stability.” No insufferably pliant economist would make that mistake today – note Yellen, above. It is obvious that Mankiw is vying to head the Fed, with such maneuvers as his recently announced post as Presidential candidate Mitt Romney’s economic adviser. Romney has stated he will jettison Bernanke. (Romney’s other adviser is Glenn Hubbard – See: Inside Job) The resourceful Bill Black, author (The Best Way to Rob a Bank is to Own One: How Corporate Executives and Politicians Looted the S&L Industry) and currently professor of Economics and Law at the University of Missouri – Kansas City recently quoted from a paper written by Mankiw in 1993: “[I]t would be irrational for operators of the savings and loans not to loot.” Harvard economics professor Kenneth Rogoff, author of This Time is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly, told Bloomberg News on May 19, 2009: “I’m advocating 6 percent inflation for at least a couple of years.” Rogoff has not changed course, recently advocating 6% inflation in the Financial Times. Mankiw was quoted in the same article as declining to “put a number on what inflation rate the Fed should shoot for, saying that the central bank has computer models that would be useful for determining that.” The “model” trick is the mental ghetto that permits fourth-rate economists to become Federal Reserve chairmen. But Mankiw is on to something. Why pin yourself to a rate, when triple-digit inflation may be required to really ruin the country? The following sequence is a lesson in how bureaucracies insinuate their failures into accepted policy. Stanley Fischer, current Governor of the Bank of Israel, doctoral Ph.D. thesis adviser to Ben S. Bernanke and to Greg Mankiw (at MIT), with stops at every institution of impeccable prestige among the anointed (chief economist at the World Bank, vice chairman of Citigroup) professed in 1997 that: “The fundamental task of a central bank is to preserve the value of the currency.” That is the first sentence in “Maintaining Price Stability,” a paper published when Fischer was First Deputy Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund. Five paragraphs later (wasting no time) Fischer wrote: “Barro (1995) and Sarel (1996) do not find a clear negative relationship below 8 percent inflation…” That is, as long as it remains at 8 percent or below, inflation is not a burden to economic growth. We can be sure the conclusion rested on the result of some computer model. Barro (1995) and Sarel (1996) cited as their authority Fischer (1993), which is noted later in Fischer (1997). In 2001, IMF economic researchers Mohsin S. Khan and Abdelhak S. Senhadji wrote a staff paper “Threshold Effects in the Relationship between Inflation and Growth.” The authors declare “[F]irst identified by Fischer (1993)” [addressing inflation below an 8 percent rate], “inflation does not have a significant effect on growth, or it may even show a slightly positive effect.” Note the change from the (1997) model Fischer from whom they quote: from “do not find clear negative relationship below 8 percent inflation,” to “it [8% inflation] may even show a slightly positive effect.” This sequence was arranged by Sheehan (2011) In 1978, Federal Reserve Governor Henry C. Wallich spoke before the graduating seniors at Fordham University. His topic was inflation. Wallich explained the loser is labor. “Inflation becomes a means of exploiting labor’s money illusion.” His speech is interesting in a contemporary context. The Wall Street protestors, who are probably building igloos in front of the Nome, Alaska city hall by now, are on to something; or, it seems, some things; but they are diffusing their influence. One of the protestors’ tendencies leans towards a government solution. This is a barren tangent. A supersized government uses supersized banks to remain supersized. Wallich told the Fordham students, that government is one of the winners in an inflation. From this Federal Reserve official: “It [inflation] allows the politician to make promises that cannot be met in real terms, because, as the government overspends trying to keep those promises, the value of those benefits shrinks.” This creates a “diminishing ability of households to provide privately for the future…. One may ask whether it is not an essential attribute of a civilized society to be able to make that kind of provision for the future.” Wallich went on to emphasize “the increasing uncertainty in providing privately for the future pushes people who are seeking security toward the government.” If alive today, he would not be surprised the protestors are looking to the government for help. Wallich (1914-1988) grew up in Berlin and lived through what he warned against (1978). Wallich added that inflation “creates a vacuum in the private sector into which the government moves.” He worried that the consequences of the inflation would be “a shift into the third dimension, away from democracy and toward authoritarianism.” In Wallich’s Germany, Joseph Goebbels (1897-1945) spoke at Nuremberg (1934): “It is no sign of wise leadership to acquaint the nation with hard facts over night. Crises must be prepared for not only politically and economically, but also psychologically. Here propaganda has its place. It must prepare the way actively and educationally. Its task is to prepare the way for practical actions. It must follow these actions step by step, never losing sight of them. In a manner of speaking, it provides the background music. Such propaganda in the end miraculously makes the unpopular popular, enabling even a government’s most difficult decisions to secure the resolute support of the people. A government that uses it properly can do what is necessary without running the risk of losing the masses.”
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| Posted: 18 Oct 2011 04:30 AM PDT |
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